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In the second of two articles on the Greek crisis as a ‘trope’, Daniel M. Knight  writes that
the Greek crisis has become a metaphor which many commentators use as a ‘shock tactic’
to press agendas of reform or austerity across Europe. This rhetoric simplifies the effects
and intricacies of the crisis on the ground in Greece and ignores its relationship with past
crises in Greek history. 
The Greek crisis has come to epitomise governmental mismanagement, unregulated
markets, corruption, and capitalist intemperance. In northern Europe, blame is attributed
squarely to Greek cit izens and their government, with layers of  rhetoric constructed and disseminated
globally as part of  the management and manipulation of  the crisis. Enduring and iconic verbal and visual
imageries are constructed around this crit ical event. The metaphor of  the Greek economic crisis has
been employed in Europe as a threat of  dispossession and f ailure if  sociopolit ical ref orm is avoided,
with panic and f ear being spread through uncontextualised claims which stimulate the public’s interest.
This contradicts the commonplace disenchantment with public polit ics now widespread in modern
democracies.
On an international level, the messages emanating f rom Greece of  protests, rioting, and strikes have
been at the f oref ront of  media reports f or nearly f our years. Unexpected and seemingly endless claims
made on the f unds of  already hard-pressed countries f or the bailouts of  Ireland, Portugal, and Greece
through the International Monetary Fund and the European Union have placed this issue f oremost on the
agenda of  each European Union nation and also of  the United States. Fear of  contagion spreading to
other poorly rated countries and a domino ef f ect of  sovereign insolvencies with banks heavily exposed
to Greece have recently inf lated the situation of  macropolit ical instability even f urther. The “Greek crisis”
has now become a polit ical trope, a persuasive “story seed” deployed by national governments drawing
on a rich pool of  metaphors and narratives to shock national populations.
Greek national identity is now def ined by
a perceived set of  universal polit ical and
economic circumstances – in this case,
crisis. The reality on the ground is not as
one-dimensional as that portrayed
through international media and polit ical
rhetoric. The crisis has been linked to
the past, as contemporary social turmoil
is placed alongside previous crises such
as the Great Famine of  1941 to 1943,
periods of  occupation under Ottoman
and German rule, and the late 1990s
stock market crash. Some Greeks may
claim that they are reliving the era of
starvation enf orced during World War II,
and that land worked by one f amily f or
over f ive hundred years has been
claimed by opportunistic f oreign
investment companies in a f orm of
“occupation” (most evident in the recent photovoltaic program). Nevertheless, the images circulated
internationally claim an objective crit ique of  a monolithic event – the Greek crisis – which disguises the
intricacy of  current local circumstances.
The Greek crisis is now employed as a trope in the polit ical theaters of  Europe as a shock tactic to
justif y sociopolit ical change. The notion of  a f resh start in order to avoid economic disaster (“on the
scale of  Greece”) is promoted to serve many purposes. Caricatures of  inept polit icians leading the nation
down a path to Greek tragedy are a common thread in accountability narratives particularly propagated
by the European right on various international stages. The metaphor of  the Greek crisis is used to help
people persuade themselves of  the need f or change. Through incit ing f ear based on the rhetoric of
crisis and insecurity, many neo-national polit ical aspirations are also achieved.
The trope of  the Greek crisis is especially prominent in election contexts, when blame can f or a t ime be
successf ully located away f rom recent incumbent governments. Coming to power in October 2009,
f ormer Greek prime minister Giorgos Papandreou (PASOK) blamed the f alsif ication of  def icit statistics
on the previous New Democracy government of  Konstantinos Karamanlis (2004–2009). Papandreou
claimed to have uncovered the “true” def icit of  13.6 per cent when taking of f ice; it had been estimated at
1.8 per cent the previous year. The majority of  Greeks init ially accepted the news with the resignation
that greets all exposures of  corruption, f or it is common knowledge that elements of  the government
“eat money” (trone lefta).
However, when the ramif ications of  the turmoil became apparent in the f orm of  f inancial bailouts, job
losses, wage cuts, and austerity measures, the Papandreou administration came in f or increasing public
crit icism. Greeks generally became disinterested in using Karamanlis as the target of  their mounting
f rustrations; blaming the previous government was no longer a polit ically viable option. Over the course
of  three years Papandreou became the f ocus of  the majority of  internal censure, while the blame that
was directed away f rom the nation-state became inf used with notions of  colonisation and occupation.
Former deputy prime minister Theodoros Pangalos inf amously placed the blame f or f inancial crisis on
the Germans: “They [the Nazis] took away the Greek gold that was in the Bank of  Greece, they took
away the Greek money and they never gave it back… I don’t say they have to give back the money
necessarily but they have at least to say ‘thanks.’” The f ormer mayor of  Athens, Nikitas Kaklamanis, also
waded into the dispute: “You [Germany] owe us 70 billion euros f or the ruins you lef t behind [in the War]”.
Local versions of  this argument are not as crude, but resonate strongly with notions of  colonisation,
coloured with the local history of  Ottoman Ciftlikades (landlords of  great landed estates), and Turkish
and German occupation.
One comparative example of  the implication of  the “Greek crisis” as a polit ical trope comes f rom the
United Kingdom. During the 2010 election – against a background of  expenses claims and over a decade
of  highly publicised polit ical spin – the question was constantly posed as to whether Britain f aced a
similar f ate to Greece. Fuelled by the imagery of  rioting on the streets of  Athens (screened live on
numerous news channels), headlines f ocused on how “Britain is f acing its own Greek tragedy”.
Opposition parties suggested parallels between the Greek situation and the potential f ate of  Britain. The
Conservative Party continues to f requently emphasise the dif f iculty in dealing with the remnants of
Labour’s economic mismanagement, underlining that their party alone is stopping Britain f rom sliding
toward Greek-style economic turmoil.
But what of  the longevity of  the “Greek crisis” as a polit ical trope? Will this crisis remain associated with
poor government, economic mismanagement, corruption, and public rebellion – a f uture ref erence point
f or impending crisis, as is the panic of  1907 or the Great Depression of  the 1930s? The Greek crisis will
spend a limited time in the global public arena; its impact as a clutch phrase f or polit ical debate is f inite,
as neoliberal crisis continues on its messy trajectory through history and geography.Greece represents a
relatively small economy, a non-Anglophone nation that is experiencing its f if teen minutes of  global
inf amy. The moment f or polit ical opportunism based on the international panic instigated by the Greek
crisis will be temporary. The power of  this trope has stringent t ime limits.
Circulating blame happens in a situation where problems are caused within the complex f low of  capital in
and around the f inancial crisis. Concurrently, the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and most
polit ical commentators continuously seek to make clear cuts in these global f lows and assign blame on
the basis of  well-def ined units, in particular nation-states. These units are then attributed a particular
cultural character that sums up the complexity of  the situation. Such essentialism provides ammunition
f or the construction of  tropes to provoke polit ical change beyond national borders, as processes of
nationalism are overwhelmed by opaque transnational f lows.
A full version of this article will be published under the title “The Greek Economic Crisis as Trope” in Focaal:
Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, Volume 2013, Volume 65 (Spring 2013).
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